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Title: THE POLITICS OF PARLIAMENTARY  
RESTORATION AND RENEWAL: 
DECISIONS, DISCRETION, DEMOCRACY 
 
Abstract: An extensive literature on aversive constitutionalism and elite blockages outlines the 
manner in which embedded political elites will generally reject or dilute reform agendas that 
threaten their privileged position within a constitutional configuration. It is for exactly this 
reason that the same seam of scholarship frequently highlights the role of crises in terms of 
SURYLGLQJD¶ZLQGRZRIRSSRUWXQLW\·WKURXJKZKLFKDVLJQLILFDQWRUIXQGDPHQWDOUHFDOLEUDWLRQRI
D SROLWLFDO V\VWHP PD\ EH DFKLHYHG ¶7KH 3DODFH RI :HVWPLQVWHU· WKH -RLQW &RPPLWWHH RQ
5HVWRUDWLRQDQG5HQHZDO5	5FRQFOXGHGLQ6HSWHPEHU¶IDFHVDQLPSHQGLQJFULVLVZKLFK
we cannot SRVVLEO\LJQRUH·7KHLUUHFRPPHQGDWLRQZDVWKDWWKH3DODFHEHFRPSOHWHO\YDFDWHGIRU
five to eight years so that a multi-billion-pound programme of rebuilding work can be 
undertaken. This article offers the first research-EDVHGDQDO\VLVRIWKH¶6FRSLQJ	3OanninJ·VWDJH
(2012-17 DQG UHYHDOV WKH ¶KLGGHQ SROLWLFV· RI 5	5 LQ WKH VHQVH RI KRZ LW WKUHDWHQV ERWK WKH
British political tradition and the position of the two main parties. This explains the nature of the 
very closed and secretive decision-making processes that have characterised this stage and why a 
number of formative decision-making points that have been deployed to frame and restrict the 
reform parameters. 
 
Keywords: Parliament; Democracy; Design; Restoration; Palace of Westminster, Decision-
making.  
 
 
Political science has for some time been concerned with understanding and explaining 
institutions, institutional behaviour and institutional change. The formal-OHJDO IRFXV RI ¶ROG·
institutionalism has in recent decades been complemented by the emergenFH RI WKH ¶QHZ·
institutionalisms that adopt a broader and more sophisticated approach to how and why 
institutions work. There is, however, a basic rationality at play in the sense that an extensive 
literature on aversive constitutionalism and elite blockages outlines the manner in which 
embedded political elites will generally reject or dilute reform agendas that threaten their 
privileged position (see, for example, Erdos 2007; Schepple, 2003). The work of George Tsebelis 
(2002) is particularly relevant due to the manner in which it develops the concept of veto players 
within a legislative context and in relation to specific policy areas. A veto player is ² put simply ² 
a player in the political game with the capacity to prevent change from the status quo. There are 
FOHDUO\FRPSOH[GHEDWHVFRQFHUQLQJWKHGHILQLWLRQRI¶DYHWR·DQG¶DSOD\HU·IRUWKHVLPSOHUHDVRQ
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that political interactions rarely operate through such definitive forms but the conceptual value 
of this approach to understanding how institutions work lies in the manner in which it reveals 
the existence of embedded but generally unequal or asymmetrical distributions of power within 
DQGEHWZHHQLQVWLWXWLRQV$Q\UHIRUPZLOOWKHUHIRUHJHQHUDOO\SURGXFH¶ZLQQHUV·DQG¶ORVHUV·WKDW, 
in turn, explains the ebb and flow of reform demands and the role of crises in potentially jolting 
systems out of their-pre-existing pathways.  
 
This focus on veto players and how institutions work provides the intellectual canvas for this 
DUWLFOH·VIRFXVXSRQWKHSURSRVHG¶UHVWRUDWLRQDQGUHQHZDO·(R&R) programme for the Palace of 
Westminster ² but with a twist. The institutional focus is therefore upon the physical home of the 
British Houses of Parliament and the fact that many features ² heating, windows, ventilation, 
drainage, electrical systems, etc., - KDYHQHYHUXQGHUJRQHUHQRYDWLRQVLQFHWKH¶1HZ·3DODFHZDV
built by Sir Charles Barry in the mid-1800s and are now antiquated and on the verge of collapse; 
the policy focus concerns the proposed multi-billion pound rebuilding project that aims to remedy 
WKHVHVWUXFWXUDOGHILFLHQFLHVDQGGHOLYHUDSDUOLDPHQWWKDWLV¶ILWIRUWKHWZHQW\-ILUVWFHQWXU\· which 
could, in theory, be quite different in terms of structures, procedures, design and culture to the 
existing institution; the agential focus revolves around the capacity and power of a relatively small 
number of backbench MPs and ministers to frustrate, control and narrow the agenda; and a twist 
is offered in the form of an approach that focuses upon the role of architecture and design in 
terms of (consciously and unconsciously) structuring politics and thereby embedding power. 
 
The core argument is that the R&R project is interpreted very much as a threat by the two main 
parties who have historically enjoyed a privileged political position ZLWKLQ$UHQGW/LMSKDUW·V(2012) 
exemplar of a power-hoarding majoritarian democracy. A threat, more specifically, due to the 
manner in which the physical design and architecture of the Palace of Westminster arguably 
serves to perpetuate a very specific executive-led model of politics that it would be irrational for 
any executive (or potential executive) to support altering (irrespective of the broader 
justifications for such a measure). This argument raises a set of questions concerning the policy 
space (narrow or wide), veto points, veto players and the decision-making process surrounding 
R&R (tight, narrow, elite or open, extensive, engaged) that cannot be easily separated from the 
dominant political culture. These are exactly the issues examined in this article using the results 
of a two-year research project that has tracked the emergence of R&R as a policy debate 
(primarily since 2012 through to the reports of both the Treasury Committee and Public 
Accounts Committee in March 2017).  
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What this reveals is the existence of a sphere of contestation that has so far remained largely 
hidden but that actually raises quite fundamental questions about the future of British democracy. 
It is for exactly this reason that certain actors within the Houses of Parliament have sought to 
close-down and delimit the agenda while others (and actors beyond parliament) have sought to 
open-up the policy horizons of R&R. Two additional issues make this a particularly rich 
empirical terrain through which to explore institutional change and adaptation. The first is that 
R&R by its very nature focuses attention on the role of design and architecture in terms of 
VWUXFWXULQJSROLWLFVDQG¶ORFNLQJLQ·a specific model of politics. The second is that in the case of 
R&R GRLQJQRWKLQJLVQRORQJHUDQRSWLRQ$OWKRXJK¶SOD\HUV·FDQDWWHPSWWRLQIOXHQFHRUHYHQ
define the ambitions or pace of R&R the simple fact is that extensive and expensive rebuilding 
work cannot be avoided. The physical fabric of the Palace is in need of urgent and far-reaching 
repairs due to the existence of dangerous asbestos, chaotic cabling, leaky roofs, hazardous 
pipework, unreliable plumbing, crumbling stonework, etc. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that 
the building will have to be abandoned within a decade unless a comprehensive programme of 
renovations is completed, and the Pre-)HDVLELOW\ 5HSRUW RI  QRWHV WKDW ¶WKH ULVN RI
FDWDVWURSKLFIDLOXUHLV LQFUHDVLQJ«>DQG@DPDMRUIDLOLQJRIWKHH[LVWLQJVHUYLFHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLV
LQHYLWDEOH·7KHUHSRUWZHQWRQWRFRQFOXGHWKDW¶>,@IWKH3DODFHRI:HVWPLQVWHUZHUHQRWDOLVWHG
building of the highest heritage value, its owners would probably be advised to demolish and 
UHEXLOG· 
 
For an internal report to make such stark conclusions underlines the politics of R&R in the sense 
WKDWWKH3DODFHRI:HVWPLQVWHULVQRWVLPSO\¶DEXLOGLQJ· (and therefore R&R arguably should not 
EHLQWHUSUHWHGDVOLWWOHPRUHWKDQD¶EULFNVDQGPRUWDU·SURMHFW. It is a globally iconic symbol of 
democracy that in itself perpetuates, manifests and shapes political behaviour in very specific 
ways that favour some actors over others. It is for this reason that ¶restRULQJRU UHQHZLQJ· the 
building can (and has) been LQWHUSUHWHG DV D WKUHDW E\ VRPH ¶SOD\HUV· DQG DQ RSSRUWXQLW\ E\
others and this is exactly the hidden but quite fundamental politics that this article seeks to 
expose as part of its institutional analysis. In this regard it makes four inter-linked arguments that 
also reflect the structure of the article.  
 
 
1. The British political tradition matters due to the manner in which it forms the dominant 
interpretive lens through which R&R has and is being assessed  
[The focus of Part I] 
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2. The architecture and design of the Palace of Westminster matters because it was explicitly 
designed to embed a very specific type of politics.  
[The focus of Part II] 
 
3. R&R KDVWKHUHIRUHRSHQHGD¶ZLQGRZRIRSSRUWXQLW\·EXWWKHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH%ULWLVK 
political tradition has cast a restrictive influence over the policy space. 
[The focus of Part III] 
 
4. The significance of R&R goes far beyond British politics and raises far-reaching questions 
concerning the institutional adaptation of democratic institutions in a context defined by anti-
politics 
[The focus of Part IV] 
 
 
 
I. DECISION-MAKING AND THE BRITISH POLITICAL TRADITION 
 
The simple argument of this section is that the British political tradition (BPT) or the British 
political culture ² as adumbrated in the classic work of W.H. Greenleaf (1983, 1987) ² matters. It 
matters due to the way in which it provides the dominant frame of reference through which 
R&R will be interpreted and assessed by the British political elite. It is therefore arguably 
impossible to understand the politics of R&R without some prior grasp of the values and 
principles of the BPT. Much has been written on both the nature of British politics and the BPT, 
and it is neither necessary nor possible to review this vast seam of scholarship here. Instead, our 
aim is to explicate what the BPT is and why it matters in order to fully understand the decision-
making process surrounding R&R in later sections. In this regard it is possible to respond in 
three ways. In term of what the BPT is we argue that it provides an underpinning cultural 
morality that continues to influence attitudes towards, for example, decision-making processes, 
the scope of legitimate action, the parameters of public engagement, etc. It is an executive-
centric tradition. In terms of why it matters we argue that the BPT underpins, legitimates and 
LPSOLFLWO\ PDLQWDLQV D VSHFLILF FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FRQILJXUDWLRQ WKDW LV JHQHUDOO\ ODEHOOHG ¶WKH
WestminsWHU0RGHO·7KHILQDOUHDVRQWKLVIRFXVRQWKH%37PDWWHUV² and specifically in relation 
to R&R ² is because it is to a great extent physically manifested in the architecture and design of 
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the Palace of Westminster. This latter point is the focus of the next section but the remainder of 
this section looks at the first two of these arguments in slightly more detail. 
 
In many ways the BPT takes us back to the earlier focus on veto players and the capacity of 
some actors to influence or block a change to the status quo. Multiple analyses have dissected 
the BPT and have highlighted its exclusionary nature, how it facilitates insulated elite modes of 
decision-making WKHXWLOLVDWLRQRILQIRUPDOPRGHVRI¶FOXEJRYHUQPHQW· and generally adopts a 
very limited (and suspicious) approach to public engagement. The BPT is therefore the cultural 
glue that cements the power-hoarding majoritarian democracy that Lijphart has tracked for 
decades (2012). The BPT is a conservative governing ideology that has historically been shared 
by both main political parties which is exactly why Marsh and Hall (2015, p.13) conclude that it 
¶UHWDLQV VWURQJ VXSSRUW IURP WKRVH ZKR EHQHILW IURP LW·. The shadow of the BPT has been 
identified in terms of political and policy outcomes. For example, the constraining impact of the 
BPT has been identified in the New Labour constitutional reform agenda (Evans 2003; Marsh 
and Hall 2007), and in the trajectory and parameters of parliamentary reform which has been 
underpinned by the binary logics of strong government and limited accountability (Flinders 2002; 
Kelso 2009), while political memoir analysis demonstrates the pervasiveness of the BPT in the 
thinking of political elites (Diamond and Richards 2012). This is a critical point. Our argument is 
not that the BPT is uncontested ² it certainly is within academic circles (see Bevir and Rhodes 
2003, 2006) ² but our argument is that it remains a dominant cultural and institutional reference 
point amongst practitioners, in general, and within debates concerning R&R, in particular. The 
argument, for example, that MPs should not decant from the Palace of Westminster during the 
Brexit negotiations due to concerns about the impact of such a shift on the legitimacy of 
decisLRQVRUWKH¶VRIWSRZHU·RIWKH8.GUDZVVXVWHQDQFHIURPWKHSRZHUIXOP\WKRORJ\RIWKH
BPT (House of Commons, 2017). The suggestion that R&R should be delayed on the basis that 
the Queen might die without the usual protocols for the lying-in-state of the monarch in 
Westminster Hall represent similar BPT-derived reservations (Walters, 2017).  
 
Taking this forward and drilling-down further into the BPT it is possible to suggest that it 
matters in relation to R&R for at least three reasons. First, in terms of process the BPT brings with 
it a well-NQRZQSUHGLOHFWLRQIRU¶PXGGOLQJWKURXJK·LQWKHVHQVHRID:KLJJLVKEHOLHILQRUJDQLF
institutional adaptation and change; the flipside being a cultural aversion to strategic thinking, 
blueprints or explicit design thinking. This, as later sections will illustrate, is of particular 
VLJQLILFDQFHZKHQLWFRPHVWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHFXUUHQW¶FULVLV·DW:HVWPLQVWHUDQGWKHIDLOXUHRI
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previous phases of restoration and renewal. Secondly, the BPT dovetails with a very specific 
institutional architecture (i.e. the Westminster Model) with an emphasis on the concentration of 
power in a single-party executive, executive dominance of the legislature, a two-party system, 
disproportional electoral system, centralised government, constitutional flexibility, etc. This 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO ¶PRGHO·HPSKDVLVHV ¶VWURQJDQG UHVSRQVLEOHJRYHUQPHQW·RYHU ¶RSHQ, inclusive and 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH JRYHUQPHQW· ZKLFK LQ WXUQ EULQJV XV EDFN WR WKH LVVXH RI ¶YHWR SOD\HUV· 7KH
notion of parliamentary sovereignty ensures not only that parliament sits at the apex of the 
Westminster model but also that those in power will exert tight control over the institution so as 
not to lose their prized position. The utilisation of the BPT by the executive in order to reject 
UHIRUP GHPDQGV LV WKH IRFXV RI 'DYLG -XGJH·V LQIOXHQWLDO The Parliamentary State (1993) and 
SDUWLFXODUO\KLVFRQFHSWRIWKH¶QHJDWLYHH[HFXWLYHPHQWDOLW\· 
 
The simple argument being made is that the BPT is likely to cast a highly restrictive shadow over 
the proposed R&R. Dominant elites are likely to interpret R&R primarily as a threat to their 
position, the decision-making process is therefore likely to be closed, elitist and tightly managed. 
A generally hidden political process is therefore likely to play out whereby the more significant or 
radical options within the policy space are closed-down, deemed unworkable and illegitimate 
from the very earliest stages. These are exactly the characteristics this research uncovers in 
relation to the initial stages of R&R between 2012-2017. However, before outlining the research 
on which this claim is made it is necessary to add value to our understanding of the BPT through 
a focus on why exactly architecture and design matter. The simple argument is that political 
science has generally failed to comprehend exactly why architecture and design matter.  
 
 
II. EMBEDDED POWER AND THE SYMBOLISM OF PARLIAMENTS 
 
The British political tradition matters, the previous section suggested, not simply because it embraces 
a specific set of values but also due to the manner in which it empowers a dominant political 
elite to veto (or eviscerate) specific reform proposals on the basis of their illegitimacy when 
judged against largely imagined constitutional criteria. The aim of this section is to highlight the 
link between this embedded power, this imagined constitution and the symbolism that is 
physically manifested in the architectural design of parliaments. This, in turn, helps deepen our 
understanding of quite why R&R poses such a threat to the existing political elite and therefore 
why the use of elite blockages is likely to be so extensive. The simple argument is therefore that 
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architecture and design matter because the Palace of Westminster was explicitly designed to embed a 
YHU\VSHFLILF W\SHRISROLWLFV7KLV LVD ¶W\SH·RISROLWLFV WKDWVRPHDFWRUVZDQW WRPDLQWDLQDQG
others want to redefine. It is neither necessary nor possible to provide an exhaustive account of 
the link between architeFWXUHDQGSROLWLFVDSDUWIURPVXJJHVWLQJWKDW&KDUOHV*RRGVHOO·V 
argument ² made over thirty years ago - concerning the need for political science to pay more 
attention to the influence of architecture remains broadly true. Political science has generally 
failed to recognise, study or comprehend how physical space (buildings, light, paintings, statues, 
seating layouts, toilets, refreshment facilities, etc.) structures political behaviour which explains 
*HUU\6WRNHU·VPRUHUHFHQWFULWLFLVPWKDW it remains  'methodologically and culturally ill-
equipped' to utilise the insights of design-thinking and design-practice. 
 
And yet we argue that the building (i.e. the Palace of Westminster) preserves the political 
traditions practiced within it or, more VSHFLILFDOO\ LW ¶SHUSHWXDWHV PDQLIHVWV DQG VKDSHV· ² to 
paraphrase Goodsell (1988) ² the exclusionary nature of the BPT. Parliaments are, as Vale (2008 
3) illustrates, symbolic buildings, which both embody and communicate myths about national 
power and identity. The grandeur and Gothic magnificence of the Palace, for example, 
exemplifies the once imperial UK state and the combined strength of its constituent nations. Its 
imposing limestone structure, topped with spires and turrets, abruptly defines the space within 
which political business is transacted. The exterior is spectacular and the Gothic style was chosen 
SUHFLVHO\ LQ RUGHU WR ¶DUWLFXODWH D KLHUDUFKLFDO LPDJH RI WKH SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO RUGHU· LQ ZKLFK
authority and subordination structured public life (Cannadine 2000, p.15) or, as Kertzer (1988) 
suggests, to imbue parliamentary politics with a degree of ritual mystification that would clearly 
distinguish insiders from outsiders in a way which defines the contours of British democracy. 
The pre-democratic origins of the building are reflected in the lack of design-thinking about 
public access and within the building a lack of windows and lighting, poor acoustics, a 
labyrinthine layout and limited signage combine to restrict the nature of public engagement in 
terms of both quality and quantity. The layout of the House of Commons chamber with its 
adversarial layout, both configures and reinforces the political culture, while artificially 
maintaining the notion of a simple two-party state. 
 
We are not suggesting that the relationship between architectural design and political behaviour 
is a simple or easily identified institutional characteristic. Even the most cursory analysis of the 
relatively limited scholarship on this topic would quickly reveal a range of viewpoints. Charles 
Goodsell, for example, suggests buildings do have direct and deterministic behavioural effects 
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while for John Parkinson (2012) the effects are more subtle and indirect in the sense that 
parliaments provide a physical site of democratic performance within which key democratic roles 
such as inclusive narration, claim-making, and decision-making take place against a backdrop of 
value-laden rituals and traditions. It is also true that buildings come to mean different things to 
different people at different moments of time and therefore their meaning and effects are not 
¶VHW LQ VWRQH· (as emphasised in the work of scholars such as Amos Rapoport). We would, 
however, suggest that architecture and design ² the structuration of space ² in Westminster 
matters due to the manner in which the British political elite imbue it with the values and 
assumptions of the British political tradition and therefore act according to those strictures. 
Spatial characteristics therefore function as a set of symbols around which narratives and 
meanings have accumulated, through historical and cultural accretion and sedimentation, to the 
extent that they exert a forceful but largely intangible influence that is reinforced by the fact that 
they have beHQILUPO\DQGSHUVLVWHQWO\DQFKRUHGWRWKH¶EXLOGLQJ-as-V\PERO· 
 
Therefore although the Palace of Westminster is a constantly evolving and adapting institution it 
is also one that is recognised for exhibiting a very distinctive set of cultural characteristics that 
have in recent years been revealed by scholars who have drawn upon the insights and methods 
of gendered institutionalism. In this regard the work of Sarah Childs (2016) provides a direct link 
between the architecture and design of the Palace of Westminster, on the one hand, and on 
manner in which actors operating within that building (MPs, peers and staff) interpret or 
respond to contextual triggers (in this case perpetuating a distinctive brand or form of elite, 
masculinsed and muscular politics)7KHUHLVDFWXDOO\YHU\OLWWOHUHVHDUFKWKDWDSSOLHV¶JRRGGHVLJQ·
RU¶LQWHOOLJHQWGHVLJQ·IUDPHZRUNVWRSDUOLDPHQWVDQGOHJLVODWXUHVDQGWKHUHIRUH&KLOGV· adoption 
of the Inter-3DUOLDPHQWDU\8QLRQ·VDVVHVVPHQWIUDPHZRUNIRUJHQGHUVHQVLWLYLW\ provides a major 
reference point from which it is possible to expose and tease-apart the politics of R&R. In fact 
what the analysis reveals is a set of embedded inequalities in both the physical design of the 
Palace of Westminster and in the rituals, ceremonies and procedures that are to some extent 
perpetuated by the physical fabric of the building. The language, the artwork, the modes of 
interaction that the physical layout creates, the use of space, the hours of parliament, the rules on 
permitting children in the chamber and committees, etc. were all not only gender insensitive but 
also not socially exclusive.  
 
For those familiar with the structure, processes and culture of parliament the conclusions of the 
Childs Report would not have been surprising. The Palace of Westminster was designed and 
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intended to create exactly that aura of intimate, informal ¶FOXEJRYHUQPHQW·(see Moran, 2003) in 
which tacit knowledge held sway. This is exactly what Winston Churchill sought to achieve in 
ZLWKKLVDUJXPHQWWKDW¶ZHVKDSHRXUEXLOGLQJVDQGWKHQRXUEXLOGLQJVVKDSHXV·HC Deb, 
28 October 1943, Col 403). He was referring to the debate concerning the rebuilding of the 
Commons chamber after it was bombed by the Luftwaffe and it was his strong opinion that the 
existing layout of the chamber had served the country well and should therefore be rebuilt as an 
exact replica of what had gone before. This decision was eventually carried but not without some 
challenge. The MP for South West Norfolk, 6RPHUVHW'H&KDLUVXJJHVWHG¶7KDWLVYHU\WUXHEXW
do they shape us so very well?....We may not, therefore, conclude that the type of building we 
KDG EHIRUH ZLOO QHFHVVDULO\ SURGXFH WKH PRVW VSDUNOLQJ /HJLVODWXUHV LQ WKH IXWXUH·
(col.463). Viscountess Astor took this further and cautioned that Churchill was looking 
¶EDFNZDUGV LQVWHDGRI IRUZDUGV·DQGFRQFOXGHG ¶,DPFHUWDLQ WKDW WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU LVQRW LQ
touch with the world that is coming, if he thinks that we ought to build a House of Commons 
H[DFWO\OLNHWKHRQHZHKDG· (col.417). 
 
Winston Churchill as a wartime Prime Minister was a dominant veto-player. But the relevance of 
this debate is the manner in which all parties recognised the democratic and political significance 
of the architecture and design of the Palace of Westminster. Reformers viewed the bombing of 
WKHFKDPEHUDVD¶ZLQGRZRIRSSRUWXQLW\·WKDWPLJKWIDFLOLWDWHFKDQJHEXWWKHSROLWLFDOHOLWHZDV
able to control the agenda, orchestrate the decision-making process and close-down the debate. 
What is interesting about the Childs Report is that it similarly interprets the dilapidated state of 
the Palace of Westminster and the proposed R&R programme as an opportunity for innovation 
and change. The report therefore calls for the proposed Parliamentary Delivery Authority (PDA) 
- DQDUP·V-length organisation with responsibility for delivering the proposed work- WR¶WULDOQHw 
layouts in any decant chamber, and review provision of a new Chamber for the return to the 
Palace of Westminster· S 6HDWV IRU DOO PHPEHUV LQ WKH FKDPEHU LQFUHDVHG IOH[LELOLW\ LQ
relation to layout, improved audio provision, more inclusionary parliamentary spaces, the re-
design of committee rooms, sufficient toilet capacity, and possibly even a brand new House of 
Commons chamber are all recommended as part of recipe for what is tHUPHGD¶JRRGSDUOLDPHQW·
These recommendations, the architectural/design sensitivity and the use of language in the 
Childs Report highlight two core issues that provide a link or buckle between the previous 
VHFWLRQ·VIRFXVRQWKH%37ZKLFK&KLOGVLVHVVHQWLDOO\FKDOOHQJLQJDQGWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ·VIRFXs 
on what the initial decision-PDNLQJSURFHVVVXUURXQGLQJ5	5UHYHDOVDERXWWKH¶SROLWLFVRI·5	5
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(and therefore the extent to which the Childs RHSRUW·V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DUH OLNHO\ WR ILQG
traction).  
 
The first issue revolves around pure politics, embedded power and path-dependency. Put very 
VLPSO\ &KLOGV· YLVLRQ RI D ¶JRRG SDUOLDPHQW· DFWXDOO\ UHYROYHV DURXQG WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI D
different governing culture, a different model of politics and that this should be embedded 
through the architectural and desiJQWKLQNLQJWKDW5	5IDFLOLWDWHV,Q&KXUFKLOO·ian terms Childs 
(and a number of other scholars and commentators) want to re-shape our buildings so that they, 
in turn, shape society differently in the future. From the position of the BPT what Childs 
promotHV DV DQ H[HPSODU RI D ¶JRRG· SDUOLDPHQW FRXOG EH LQWHUSUHWHG YHU\ PXFK DV D ¶EDG·
parliament due to the manner in which it seeks to shift the balance between representative and 
responsible government, facilitate greater public engagement and seeks to dilute or erase the 
power of specific historical symbols and conventions. This brings us to a second issue and a 
focus on scale. As comparative institutional analysis has revealed, there are different types or 
gradations of reform from relatively minor micro-political changes or concessions through to 
major macro-SROLWLFDO ¶PHJD-FRQVWLWXWLRQDO· WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV$V WKHRSHQLQJ VHFWLRQ·V IRFXVRQ
the BPT underlined, the British constitution, in general, and parliamentary reform, in particular, 
has generally operated through minor but relatively constant changes that represent part of the 
¶OLYLQJ· RU ¶RUJDQLF· FRQVWLWXWLRQ 7KLV LV RIWHQ UHIHUUHG WR ² amongst both scholars and 
practitioners - DVWKH¶FUDFNVDQGZHGJHV·WKHVLVRISDUOLDPHQWDU\UHIRUPVHH:ULJKW2004) and 
means that change generally occurs through the imposition of relatively minor concessions in 
relation to rules or procedures which then provides a wedge that can be used to expand and 
develop the initial concession into a more significant change over time. But what this section has 
emphasised is that the architecture and design of the building also need to be understood not 
just in terms of reform pathways but also in relation to how they embed power and specific ways 
of thinking about politics.  
 
 
Table 1: Gradations of Parliamentary Restoration and Renewal 
 
With this in mind, Table 1 draws upon the existing research base to offer a graded framework 
for the analysis of R&R. It offers a spectrum from radical macro-political reforms through to 
more minor micro-political changes. The value of this framework is that it offers an organising 
perspective through which to understand developments, positioning and game-playing in relation 
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WR 5	5 ,W LV DOVR VHQVLWLYH WR KLVWRULFDO SDWWHUQV RI FKDQJH LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW WKH ¶FUDFNV DQG
ZHGJHV· WKHVLV EDVLFDOO\ VXJJHVWV WKDW FKDQJH JHQHUDOO\ RFFXUV WKURXJK WKH H[SDQVLRQ DQG
development of what were originally fairly minor concessions by the executive. Veto-players 
UHWXUQLQJWRWKH7VHEHOLV·ian framework) are likely to focus on restricting the parameters of the 
policy space, and will utilise their formal and informal resources within the existing institutional 
framework in order to neutralise what they define as threats. The core argument of this section 
has been that it is the design and architecture of the Palace of Westminster  - the building and 
the physical space ² although rarely acknowledged, provides the foundations (theoretically and 
physically) for a quasi-elitist, relatively thin and definitely masculine form of politics. Major 
change is only therefore likely to occur in the wake of major regime challenges that undermine 
the position and resources of the existing political elite to prevent change. The next section uses 
Table 1 as a tool through which to tease apart the unfolding politics of R&R.  
 
 
 
III. DECISION-MAKING IN THE R&R PROCESS 
 
The aim of this section is to present the findings of research that has tracked and analysed the 
evolution of the proposed R&R programme since the 2012 Pre-Feasibility Report. It offers three 
main findings. The first identifies the existence of a quite fundamental political debate or 
polarisation concerning the aims and objectives of R&R.  7KH ¶KHULWDJH DSSURDFK· DGRSWV D
broadly conservative lens and focuses on restoring and renewing the physical fabric of what 
alrHDG\ H[LVWV WKH ¶GHPRFUDF\ DSSURDFK· DGRSWV D EURDGHU OHQV WKDW LQWHUSUHWV 5	5 DV DQ
opportunity to restore and renew the performance and perception of democratic politics more 
broadly. The second finding is that, in line with the arguments of Part I (above) the existing 
political elite is seeking to restrict and minimise the potential political impact of R&R through 
the adoption of a heritage-orientated emphasis and the utilisation of critical veto-points and 
agenda-setting powers within the decision-making process. Therefore the final main finding is 
that although the scope of the proposed R&R programme is far from definite, this early analysis 
suggests that macro-SROLWLFDOUHIRUPVWKDWVHHNWRGUDPDWLFDOO\¶UHQHZDQGUHVWRUH·WKHQDWXUHRI
British parliamentary democracy are unlikely to occur. More specifically (and thirdly) this analysis 
RI WKH LQLWLDO ¶H[SORUDWRU\SKDVH· -2017) facilitates the chronological identification of what 
might be termed HLJKW¶QDUURZLQJSRLQWV·¶elite veto points· or ¶elite blockages·: 
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#1  The January 2012 decision by the House of Commons Commission that no 
decision would be made until R&R until the 2015-2020 Parliament 
#2   7KHLQLWLDOGHFLVLRQWRUXOHRXWWKH¶QHZEXLOG·option. 
#3  The October 2014 decision by the House of Commons Commission that the 
IOA would not be published until after the 2015 general election. 
#4 7KHOLPLWHG¶2XWFRPH/HYHOV·WKDWZHUHFRQWDLQHGLQWKH,QGHSHQGHQW2SWLRQV
Appraisal and were framed by the Pre-Feasibility Report.  
#5  The marginalisation of the public and democratic campaign groups by the Joint 
Committee. 
#6 The recommendation by the Joint Committee that decant chambers should 
replicate those of the Palace of Westminster  
#7 The decisions of the Treasury and Public Accounts Committees in the House of 
Commons to launch inquiries into R&R in January 2017.  
#8 Delays by the government in timetabling the debate and vote on the 
recommendation of the Joint Committee in both House. 
 
 
The rest of this section provides the empirical basis and detailed analysis on which these 
arguments are based and begins with an account of the development of R&R in terms of 
framing, decision-VWDJHVDQG¶SOD\HUV· 
 
On the January and February 2012 agendas of the Houses of Commons Commission (House of 
Commons, 2012a) and the House of Lords House Committee (House of Lords, 2012a) 
UHVSHFWLYHO\ZDVWKH LVVXHRIWKH ¶0RGHUQLVDWLRQRIWKH3DODFHRI:HVWPLQVWHU·7KLVZDVQot a 
new issue, and the increased maintenance costs of the Palace had long been a perennial feature 
of Palace administration (Cotter et al, 2016). By 2012, however, the scale of the problem in terms 
of the decaying condition of the building was critical. The first elite blockage (#1) was recorded 
at this point, however, as its January 2012 the House of Commons Commission agreed a 
WLPHVFDOH IRU ZKDW ZDV WKHQ WHUPHG WKH ´0RGHUQLVDWLRQ RI WKH 3DODFH RI :HVWPLQVWHUµ WKH
agreed timescale delayed any decision on the future of the Palace until the 2015-2020 Parliament. 
Instead, a Study Group was appointed following those 2012 meetings, and commissioned to 
produce a pre-IHDVLELOLW\ VWXG\ LQFOXGLQJ D IXOO UDQJH RI SRVVLELOLWLHV ¶IURP HLWKHU D QHZ EXLOG
Parliament or completely modernised Palace at one end of the spectrum, to a programme of 
managed replacement and condition-EDVHGPDLQWHQDQFHDWWKHRWKHU·3UH-Feasibility Study 2012, 
S7KHUHSRUWRIWKH3)6*URXSDGRSWHG+07UHDVXU\·VUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUDOOSXEOLFbusiness 
cases, as set out in the Green Book, to focus on five dimensions: strategic, economic, 
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commercial, financial, and management. But the democratic case was not mentioned explicitly at 
DOO2QO\WKHVHFWLRQIRFXVHGRQWKH¶VWUDWHJLFFDVHIRUFKDQJH·makes reference to this dimension 
RIXVDJHLQWHUPVRISDUOLDPHQWDVD¶ZRUNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQ·QRWLQJWKDWWKHEXLOGLQJ 
 
 [H]has to provide decent standards of accommodation for all those who work within it, or visit as 
citizens, as school children on educational trips or as witnesses to Parliamentary business, and the 
building has to support the modern ways in which Parliaments work with informal as well as 
IRUPDOPHHWLQJVGLJLWDOLQIRUPDWLRQDQGPRELOHGHYLFHV·3UH-Feasibility Study 2012, p.28).  
 
The report largely focused on listing the many ways in which the Palace of Westminster was in a 
state of significant material disrepair and thus in need of extensive building work. Crucially, the 
VWUDWHJLF FDVH IRU FKDQJH ZDV FOHDU WKDW DVVHW PDQDJHPHQW ZDV ¶WKe overwhelming driver for 
PRGHUQLVDWLRQ· DQG WKDW ¶RWKHU SRWHQWLDO EHQHILWV VXFK DV RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR LPSURYH VHFXULW\
DFFHVV >DQG@ FLUFXODWLRQ· ZRXOG EH ¶E\-SURGXFWV· 3UH-Feasibility Study 2012, p.6). Therefore, 
while the Pre-Feasibility Study did include a broad range of options in its analysis, including that 
of a new building, the practical logic was always geared towards remaining on the existing site 
and focused on refurbishing the existing infrastructure. Indeed, when the House of Commons 
Commission (House of Commons, 2012b) and the House of Lords House Committee (House 
of Lords, 2012b) met (separately) in October 2012 to consider the PFS report, they each ruled out 
the option of constructing a new parliament building, and agreed that no further analysis of this option would be 
undertaken (#2). Crucially, neither committee outlined the reasons underpinning this decision, and 
no publicly available records of committee discussions of this point are available. Thus, analysis 
of the publicly available documentation fails to uncover how this important decision was made. 
This, coupled with the very limited attention given to the new building option in the PFS report, 
strongly suggests that the option was included simply so it could be said to have been included, 
but without compelling anyone seriously to consider it.  
 
Within just a few short months, therefore, the R&R programme parameters had been 
significantly narrowed. Our point here is not normative: we are not advocating the building of a 
new legislature for the UK. Our point is analytical in the sense that a core aim of the programme 
LV WR GHOLYHU D SDUOLDPHQW WKDW LV ¶ILW IRU WKH WZHQW\-ILUVW FHQWXU\· DQG WKHUHIRUH D GHWDLOHG
discussion of the design variables that would inform the creation of a new building (informed by 
recent international experience) would, at the very least, have created a benchmark, reference 
point or organising perspective against which to consider R&R at Westminster, Put slightly 
GLIIHUHQWO\WKHRSHQLQJTXHVWLRQVKRXOGDUJXDEO\KDYHEHHQ¶What do we want and how do we get LW"·, 
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DVRSSRVHG WR ¶WKDWGRZHKDYHDQGKRZGRZHDGDSWLW"· In addition, as Table 1 demonstrates, the 
key decisions which framed the R&R parameters were made by MPs and peers on the House of 
Commons Commission and House of Lords House Committee; that is, those actors who are 
most immersed in the political symbolism of the Palace, and who are typically identified by 
critics of the British political tradition as being at the heart of elitist and secretive decision-
making. Indeed, the trajectory of R&R decision-making sketched here simply reinforces 
arguments about the pervasiveness of the BPT. 
 
 
TABLE 2: Key decision-stages in the R&R programme. 
 
This refurbishment-focused 2012 report therefore shaped the IOA report, produced by a 
commission led by Deloitte, and including AECOM and HOK, who were commissioned in 
December 2013, but were required to operate within the choice parameters dictated by their 
client, that is, the Houses of Parliament. The IOA report, was completed in September 2014. 
The House of Commons Commission has not stated when it received the report, but the 
minutes of its October 2014 state that the Commission agreed not to authorise the publication 
of thHUHSRUWXQWLO´-XQH-XO\µLHafter the May 2015 general election which reflects the 
PDQQHULQZKLFK5	5LVIUHTXHQWO\GHVFULEHGE\03VDVD¶WR[LFLVVXH· This was a further elite 
blockage, delaying scrutiny or examination of the findings (i.e. #3). 
 
The IOA report provided a highly detailed analysis of how the R&R might proceed in practice in 
relation to three delivery options, each of which mapped GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV RI ¶GHFDQWLQJ· RI
parliament from the Palace while the work took place, and in relation to three different outcome 
levels in terms of the extent of work undertaken. In offering specific information in terms of 
costs, parliamentary decant options, and proposals for renovating existing parts of the Palace in 
order to create more space, the IOA report responded directly to the strategic case laid out by 
the Pre-Feasibility Study Group. Table 2 provides the summary of the potential Scenarios 
outlined by the IOA, and the shaded boxes identify the shortlisted Scenarios. Outcome Level A 
provides for a basic level of R&R, while the Outcome Level C provides for the repurposing of 
some parliamentary areas (Deloitte 2015, p.6). 
 
 
Table 3: R&R of the Palace of Westminster, Options and Estimates. 
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The decision at this point returned to Parliament, with the appointment of the Joint Committee on the 
Palace of Westminster, in July 2015, to consider the IOA report. The Committee was appointed following 
motions in both Houses, but it is important to note that the Houses were asked to agree an already 
decided list of Members from both Houses. No minutes or details on how the Committee membership 
was chosen have been published; and even the decision on the party balance on the Committee was made 
E\ ´WKH XVXDO FKDQQHOVµ UDWKHU WKDQ LQ D WUDQVSDUHQW PDQQHU +/ 'HE  -XO\  &RO 02). In 
November 2015, the Joint Committee launched a public consultation on two key issues: the scope of the 
refurbishment work to be undertaken LH ¶2XWFRPHV·, and how the work should be delivered (i.e. 
¶Delivery 2SWLRQV·. That consultation is considered below, but for now we can complete our sketch of 
the R&R decision-process thus far with the formal recommendations of the Joint Committee, published 
in September 2016 and which advocated a full decant (HC659, 2016). The process since the publication 
of this report has, however, reflected the politics of R&R that this article seeks to bring to the fore. On 10 
March 2017 the Public Accounts Committee (HC1005, 2017) examined R&R and recommended swift 
action: ¶Our conclusion is clear: the option favoured by the Joint Committee is most likely to be the most 
economical, effective and efficient choice·RQO\IRUWKH7UHDVXU\&RPPLWWHHWRSXEOLVKDUHSRUWseven 
days later (HC1097, 2017) calling for a fundamental review of the whole project that would even re-visit 
the initial brief underpinning the Deloitte-OHG,2$¶Until this work has been carried out it·WKH7UHDVXU\
&RPPLWWHHFRQFOXGHG¶it is our view that it would be imprudent for the House to commit to a specific 
option or timetable·SDUD. The bottom-line is that over six-months after the Joint Committee made its 
recommendation to parliament the future of the R&R programme appears, if anything, more uncertain 
despite the growing evidence of an escalating risk of a catastrophic failure in the physical infrastructure of 
the building. Moreover, although the politics of R&R is generally playing out behind the scenes at 
Westminster it is attracting increased media attention and condemnation. An editorial in The Times (3 
April 2017), for example, noted: 
As the Houses of Parliament crumble and leak around them, ministers are postponing an urgent 
but straightforward decision on how to repair them. Influential backbenchers are meanwhile 
lobbying for an unnecessarily complex and expensive plan that would serve no one's interests but 
their own. 
 
A number of points emerge from this brief account of the initial 2012-2017 decision-making 
process. First, while the scope of the project may have been theoretically expansive at the Pre-
Feasibility Report stage, when the option of a new parliament building was at least included in 
the remit, that scope subsequently narrowed considerably with the immediate exclusion of the 
¶QHZEXLOG·RSWLRQ7KHWKUXVWRI5	R was from that point arguably engineered more towards a 
heritage-focused project rather than any sort of democracy-focused initiative (discussed further 
below). As a result (and secondly), when viewed through reform gradations of Table 1 the 
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proposed restoration and renewal works are minimal and generally retain a strong preference for 
continuity over change (i.e. a key aspect of the BPT). The difference between Outcome Levels A, 
B and C is very small (i.e. #4) and when viewed against the graded reform profiles of Table 1 the 
plans arguably focus on a limited number of micro-political enhancements while essentially 
¶UHQHZLQJ DQG UHVWRULQJ· WKH H[LVWLQJ EXLOGLQJ. Veto players on the House of Commons 
Commission and House of Lords House Committee were therefore able to effective define the 
parameters of R&R from the outset and subsequent reports and inquiries have worked very 
much within that set pathway. Moreover, the policy space has been tightly controlled through 
the patronage of party managers who agreed the party balance of the Joint Committee (which 
was co-FKDLUHG E\ JRYHUQPHQW PLQLVWHUV EXW DOVR VXEVHTXHQWO\ WKURXJK WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V
FRQWURORIZKHQWKHMRLQWFRPPLWWHH·VYRWHZLOOEHGHEDWHGDQGYRWHGXSRQ$QG\HWWRGHVFULEH
a simple process of tight executive management would be to over-look the existence of more 
subtle and multi-OHYHOOHG JDPHV 7KHUH LV D ¶SROLWLFV within SROLWLFV· GLPHQVLRQ RI 5	5 WKDW
deserves comment.   
In a risk-averse and generally conservative institution where change has historically occurred at a 
glacial pace and in which the majority of the existing political elite will view any reform agenda as 
a potential threat to their position rather than an opportunity there is clearly a need to step softly 
when considering or framing projects, especially when their implications are potentially so far-
reaching as R&R. Moreover with the support of both houses necessary for R&R to proceed 
there was clearly political advantage to be gained by framing R&R as a purely technical heritage-
based project in which the democratic reform implications were over-looked. To do otherwise 
would have been to almost guarantee a lack of support within parliament and the rejection of any 
plans. What is therefore noticeable about the official documentation surrounding the R&R 
programme is that it is almost depoliticised in terms of tone and content. Making R&R too 
RYHUWO\ ¶SROLWLFDO· ZRXOG RQO\ ¶VSRRN WKH KRUVHV· 7KLV WHFKQRFUDWLF OLQHDU SURMHFW-management 
approach can be read three ways. The first would see this as wholly appropriate given the fact 
WKDW5	5 LV LQHYLWDEO\ JRLQJ WREH D FRPSOH[ ¶PHJD-SURMHFW· DQG WKH ,2$ZDVTXLWH FRUUHFWO\
operating within the formal project parameters set down out of the PFS. A second and more 
politicised reading might interpret this highly technical framing of R&R as an attempt by the 
existing political elite to close-down and supress the demands of those who have more extensive 
GHPRFUDWLFDPELWLRQVIRU5	5LHWKH\ZDQWLWWR¶XQORFN·WKHFXUUHQW political equilibrium). But 
there is also a third interpretation that would explain depoliticisation at this stage as the rational 
strategy of an ardent reform advocate or constitutional entrepreneur. In effect this strategy 
would play-down the reform implications of R&R at this stage in order to allow a degree of 
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policy-momentum and public debate to develop at which point it may be harder for the 
government to control the agenda and easier for the policy space to be expanded.  
Given that the current decision-making and framing process surrounding R&R has been 
dominated by no more than a dozen people with close connections to the two main parties that 
have traditionally been wedded to the Westminster model suggests that this third interpretation 
might be slightly optimistic. Indeed, what the detailed analysis of R&R reveals is incredibly tight 
control over the review and discussion surrounding R&R. This is something the Speaker of the 
+RXVHRI&RPPRQV UHFRJQLVHG LQ2FWREHU ZKHQKH FDOOHG IRU D ¶QDWLRQDO FRQYHUVDWLRQ·
about the opportunities R&R offered for thinking differently about politics (see Bercow, 2017). 
The Pre-Feasibility Report has also been aware of the potential public backlash from spending 
billions of pounds on the Palace of Westminster in a period dominated by anti-political 
VHQWLPHQWDQGHFRQRPLFDXVWHULW\3DUOLDPHQWZRXOGKDYHWREH¶SURDFWLYHLQFRPPXQLFDWLRQ·WR
focus on long-term benefits of refurbishment the report argued (2012, p.66) but this was not an 
approach adopted by the Joint Committee during its inquiry. $¶FDOOIRUHYLGHQFH·ZDVSXEOLVKHG
and theoretically facilitated public engagement but the terms of the inquiry and the specific 
questions set out in the call were incredibly technocratic and narrow. Of the twelve consultation 
questions set out by the Joint Committee, only four were targeted at the public, with the 
remainder focused on the collecting views of MPs and parliamentary staff, and this framing of 
the consultation arguably illustrates the degree to which it is shaped around serving the needs of 
parliamentary actors. In addition, the consultation approach chosen by the Joint Committee 
involves the standard select committee model (i.e. a call for evidence posted on the website and 
an invitation to submit written responses) with no account given to recent Liaison Committee 
advice regarding innovative outreach (HC470, 2015). In addition, the Joint Committee (JC) held 
only two oral evidence sessions as part of its inquiry work, which was remarkable given the 
significance of the topic under consideration.  
 
$QG \HW DV 3HWHU %OXQGHOO -RQHV DQG 'RLQD 3HWUHVFX·V Architecture and Participation (2005) 
illustrates, opening up questions regarding architectural restoration or re-design to processes of 
public engagement risks, to some extent, losing control over a process. Advocates of far-
reaching change might size the agenda or unexpected options suddenly become the focus of 
populist pressures. Such risks are anathema to the BPT and instead the work of the Joint 
Committee suggests the conscious marginalisation of the public at that stage in the process (i.e. 
#5). This is further confirmed by the analysis of the oral evidence sessions. Key politicians were 
invited to offer their opinions on R&R, as were representatives of the media, heritage specialists, 
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engineers and project managers but civic groups and campaign organisations were not. Once 
again this could be interpreted as a rational approach for even the most reform-minded 
committee or politician due to the need to secure the approval of both houses for R&R to 
progress to the next level. It could, however, be seen as simply the approach of a political elite 
that has no interest in reforming an institution that serves it so well and in this regard. Moreover, 
in terms of identifying elite blockages and the narrowing or closing-off of options what is 
LQWHUHVWLQJDERXWWKH-RLQW&RPPLWWHH·VILQDOUHSRUWLVWKDWDOWKRXJKLWGRHVUHFRPPHQGWKHIXOO
decant option (i.e. Option 3, Table 3) it does seek to veto the opportunity for testing and 
assessing institutional innovations (i.e. #6). In complete opposition to the recommendations of 
the Childs Report and other commentators the Joint Committee suggests under their 
¶UHFRPPHQGHGFULWHULDIRUWHPSRUDU\DFFRPPRGDWLRQ·WKDW¶7KHJHQHUDO floor space and layout 
RIWKHWZR&KDPEHUVVKRXOGEHUHSOLFDWHGDVIDUDVSRVVLEOHLQWHPSRUDU\DFFRPPRGDWLRQS·
DQG¶7KHGLYLVLRQOREELHVVKRXOGDVIDUDVSRVVLEOHEHUHSOLFDWHG·S 
 
This in turn is indicative of a preference for the status quo and an awareness that the simple 
process of decanting and establishing a temporary chamber that will sit for at least six years will 
inevitably affect the culture and expectations of members: it will affect the BPT. The temporary 
chamber is likely to be better equipped than the chamber of the Lords or Commons in terms of 
IT, wi-fi, acoustics, heating and may even offer each and every MP their own seat (although the 
limited space in the proposed decant option makes this unlikely). Well before the Joint 
Committee had published Oonagh Gay had already highlighted the possible reform-impact of 
GHFDQW E\ VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW ¶if MPs become used to more spacious and well-equipped facilities, 
maybe with electronic voting, they might be reluctant to return to a mere restoration with 
traditional lobbies. Similarly the public may well want more transparent ways of seeing legislators 
DWZRUN WKDQUHVWULFWHGVHDWLQJ LQJDOOHULHVZHOODERYH WKHFKDPEHUV· To some extent the Joint 
Committee has attempted to close down the policy space and options surrounding the decant. 
Whether this strategy will actually work is currently unclear and depends to a large extent on how 
the government responds to the divergent recommendations contained in the Treasury Select 
Committee and Public Accounts Committee reports of March 2017 (#7) and if a debate and 
YRWHLVKHOGRQWKH-RLQW&RPPLWWHH·VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ7KH-RLQW&RPPLWWHH·VUHVSRQVHstated 
WKDW LW ZDV ´essential that the R&R Programme now proceeds to its next stages [the 
parliamentary debate aQGYRWH@ZLWKRXWGHOD\µEXW² as already mentioned - the Government has 
consistently declined to schedule this debate, and as the executive retains control of 
parliamentary time, this has prevented the debate from taking place, and thus blocked the R&R 
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programme from proceeding (#8). 7KLVSRLQWGRYHWDLOVZLWKWKH7UHDVXU\·V&RPPLWWHH·VEURDGHU
criticism that ¶the process by which and by whom some decisions have been taken on restoration 
and renewal to date are opaque· (HC 1097, 2017, para.6). The research presented in this article 
suggests that this criticism is valid and encourages us to consider why this finding actually 
matters vis-à-vis a number of broader debates about the future of democratic governance and its 
institutions.  
 
V. HOW INSTITUTIONS (DO NOT) WORK 
 
Although the empirical focus of this article has been on the proposed R&R of the Palace of 
Westminster its main focus has actually been upon the broader theme of institutional adaptation. 
The insight that Tsebelis offers in this context is a focus on veto players and embedded political 
elites who are likely to have few incentives to support reforms that are intended to weaken their 
position. The added value of the approach offered in this article has centred around it focus on 
WKHUROHRIDUFKLWHFWXUHDQGGHVLJQLQWHUPVRISK\VLFDOO\HPEHGGLQJFHUWDLQ¶UXOHVRIWKHJDPH·
that will inevitably favour some groups, parties or individuals above others. This is frequently 
UHIOHFWHGLQWKHDVVXPHGOLQNEHWZHHQ¶QHZSDUOLDPHQWV·DQG¶QHZSROLWLFV·WKDWLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKH
JOREDODUFKLWHFWXUDODQGGHVLJQVXUYH\VWKDWLQFOXGH;0/·VParliament project (2016) and Christian 
.XKQ·V PLENUM: Places of Power (2014). What these surveys rarely explore, however, is the 
politics of parliamentary restoration, renewal or even abolition in terms of the resources and 
powers that different actors utilise in order to facilitate or block change. The main conclusion of 
WKLVDUWLFOHLVWKDWWKHDQDO\VLVRIWKHLQLWLDO¶Scoping & Planning· between 2012-2017 suggests that 
a process of aversive constitutionalism is ensnaring or suffocating the proposed R&R. The 
democratic potential of R&R is being denied, rejected, and to some extent deemed illegitimate 
with the BPT acting as a legitimating constitutional touchstone.  
 
Aspirational constitutionalism, by contrast and to adopt the insights provided by Scheppele (2003), 
refers to a process of constitution or polity building in which decision-makers understand what 
they are attempting to achieve and why. It is forward looking, inclusive and confident. It might 
WKHQ EH DUJXHG WKDW UHSRUWV VXFK DV &KLOGV· The Good Parliament report or the Design 
&RPPLVVLRQ·V Designing Democracy report of 2015 reveal an aspirational approach to R&R; the 
reports of the parliamentary committees a more aversive approach. It could be argued that the 
cultural dynamics of the British constitution has always been imbued with aversive 
constitutionalism and therefore this approach should not be surprising. And yet what this 
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analysis has attempted to bring to the fore is the manner in which the physical space of the 
Palace of Westminster is infused with this constitutional morality. This creates an institutional 
trap and complex bargaining games that are likely to produce gridlock and inaction. The question 
is then really whether the institutions of democratic governance can afford to reject the 
increasing public demands for greater evidence of innovation and engagement. Do established 
parliaments and legislatures possess the adaptive capacity to play a role in closing the gap that 
seems to have emerged between the governors and the governed? The literature on post-
democracy and the life and death of politics ² QRW WRPHQWLRQ WKH ¶VXLFLGH· ¶HQG·RU ¶FULVLV·RI
democracy ² reminds us that the proposed R&R is taking place within a far larger socio-political 
context. It is for this reason that the remainder of this concluding section briefly examines the 
implications of this article vis-à-vis a number of micro, meso and macro-political debates. 
 
In terms of the micro-politics of R&R and the future of the Palace of Westminster the future 
remains opaque. What is clear from the analysis offered above is that R&R currently lacks any 
FOHDU ¶YLVLRQ· DQG WKDW QR FRQVWLWXWLRQDO HQWUHSUHQHXU ZLWK VXFK D YLVLRQ DQG WKH FDSDFLW\ WR
remove internal blockages has emerged. Indeed, the reverse is true in the sense that R&R is 
largely viewed by MPs and peers as a toxic issue to be avoided at all costs. As a result very basic 
questions exist as to the ownership of the programme, the division of responsibilities between 
actors and core strategic ambitions. This latter point is critical. The current core aims of R&R 
include a commitment to (1) protect the physical heritage of a Grade 1 listed World Heritage Site, 
while also (2) delivering a parliament that is fit for the twenty-first century. And yet how exactly a 
¶Sarliament fit for the twenty-ILUVWFHQWXU\·FDQEHUHWURILWWHGLQWRDQDQFLHQWUR\DOSDODFHVXEMHFW
to extensive heritage preservation orders remains unclear. This explains the concern of the SNP 
member of the Joint Committee, Neil Gray MP, about whether R	5ZDV¶DUWLILFLDOO\FURZEDUULQJ
DSDUOLDPHQW LQWRDQROGSDODFHDWDSUHPLXP"·7KLV UDLVHVRQ-going questions about the initial 
GHFLVLRQWRUHMHFWWKH¶QHZEXLOG·RSWLRQVRHDUO\LQWKHSROLF\SURFHVVEXWWKLVLQLWVHOIPD\KDYH
reflected the existence of complex bargaining and game playing within the internal processes in 
order to achieve at least some movement. Potential elite blockages can therefore be removed but 
only through the granting of concessions that are likely to bring the point of equilibrium back 
towards the status quo (as arguably occurred in relation to the internal dynamics of the Joint 
Committee). And yet the broader and long-term risks of this tendency was highlighted by the 
Joint Committee when it noted,  
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It would be an error for Parliament to miss this rare opportunity to deliver a more open, efficient, 
inclusive and outward-IDFLQJSDUOLDPHQWDU\EXLOGLQJ«)XWXUHJHQHUDWLRQVZLOOQRWWKDQNXVLIZH
fail to seize [this] opportunity and instead preserve for posterity all the obstacles to public access 
and to the effective working of Parliament which the building currently embodies (para.247). 
 
7KHSKUDVH ¶ZKLFK WKHEXLOGLQJFXUUHQWO\HPERGLHV· UHLQWURGXFHV WKH LVVXHVRIDUFKLWHFWXUHDQG
design. Indeed a provocative argument could be made that the real problem for those who want 
R&R to adopt a more innovative, expansive and democracy-orientated approach that 
acknowledges the extent of anti-SROLWLFDO VHQWLPHQW LV WKDW WKH ¶FULVLV· DQG ¶FDWDVWURSKLF IDLOXUHV·
that several reports have now highlighted remain existential threats. A major fire, flood, sewerage 
leak, stonework collapse or outbreak of asbestos poisoning would suddenly facilitate both the 
public debate and the wide review of options that is currently being restricted by the existing 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO VWUXFWXUH 7KLV FDQ EH ODEHOOHG WKH ¶)DZNHV WKHVLV· EXW D PDMRU LQVWLWXWLRQDO FULVLV
would at least remove or downgrade heritage considerations and shift the focus away from the 
current starting point (i.e. What do we have and how do we adapt it?) towards a more open 
(aspirational) discussion of ¶:KDWGRZHZDQWDQGKRZGRZHJHWLW"· And yet this question in itself 
forces us to step back and adopt a broader analytical and comparative perspective. R&R 
represents a major opportunity for the political and social sciences to play a role in democratic 
design, testing new innovations and generally providing an evidence base on which decisions 
could be based. The dilemma, however, arises from the fact (as outlined above) that political 
science is not well-placed to respond to this demand-side signal. The existing research base on, 
for example, the impact of seating arrangements on political behaviour or the impact of 
electronic voting on decision-making is surprisingly thin. The paradox here is that although a 
JURZLQJ HYLGHQFH EDVH H[LVWV LQ UHODWLRQ WR ¶LQWHOOLJHQW GHVLJQ· ZLWKLQ DUFKLtectural and design 
studies that reveals the impact of spatial factors such as windows, light and acoustics on, for 
example, student attainment levels or patient recovery times the implications or relevance of 
these findings for parliaments and legislatures remains unexamined.  
 
This flows into a broader comparative point in the sense that the UK is clearly not unique in the 
sense of having to deal with major structural challenges or questions about the suitability of its 
legislative buildings. The major refurbishment of the Canadian parliament in Ottawa ² the 
¶UHKDELOLWDWLRQ RI 3DUOLDPHQW +LOO· ² is probably the most similar ongoing project to R&R 
currently underway in the world but has not been the topic of detailed scholarly or lesson-
learning analysis. The renovation of the Reichstag in Berlin also has major relevance due to its 
explicit ambitions to blend history with a radical architectural departures - notably in relation to 
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the use of light, public space and the addition of a major glass cupola - that were designed to 
V\PEROLVHDQHZSKDVHLQ*HUPDQSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\DQGLQWHUPVRI¶QHZ-EXLOGV·WKHDUFKLWHFWXUH
and design of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly of Wales was explicitly intended to 
prevent the replication of majoritarian politics in Edinburgh and Cardiff. The new Georgian 
parliament in Kutaisi ² a massive glass dome - is physically and geographically intended to 
represent a clear break with the FRXQWU\·VSROLWLFDO SDVW DQGKDVQRWEHHQ ORFDWHG FORVH WR WKH
government buildings on Tbilisi; whereas in India the constitutionally ascribed link between 
population and representation has created institutional pressures for expansion that can only be 
accommodated through the creation of a new parliamentary complex. The links with the current 
situation in Westminster are obvious but three issues flow out of this international landscape. 
The first is that the internal planning documents regarding R&R have generally been quite 
parochial in the sense that similar projects around the world have hardly been mentioned, let 
alone carefully examined to identify key insights, good practice, etc. The second issue revolves 
around the lack of comparative political analysis on the design or architecture of parliaments 
around the world, let alone on the political dynamics underlying critical design and architectural 
decisions. This, in turn, leads back to a more disciplinary set of questions concerning impact and 
engagement and whether a more explicit and ambitious design-oriented model of political 
scieQFHPLJKWRIIHUDFULWLFDO¶URDGWRUHOHYDQFH·WKDWKDVVRIDUEHHQODUJHO\RYHU-looked. But at 
the broadest level the significance of the proposed R&R of the Palace of Westminster arguably 
rests upon its relationship to broader narratives and concerns regDUGLQJ ¶WKH OLIH DQG GHDWK RI
GHPRFUDF\·.HDQH2009) which have already high-lighted the emergence of post-parliamentary, 
post-representative, post-democratic forms of politics. Whether parliament can demonstrate its 
continued relevance and adaptive qualities in this broader context and offer a more aspirational 
approach by seeing R&R as an opportunity rather than a threat remains to be seen.   
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Table 1: Gradations of Parliamentary Restoration and Renewal 
LEVEL DEFINITION EXAMPLES 
Macro-
parliamentary 
[Major] 
Underpinning elements of the 
physical fabric and design of 
parliament, which provide the 
foundation of the system while also 
generally ascribing a pattern or 
model of democracy 
&UHDWLRQRIDQHZSDUOLDPHQWDU\EXLOGLQJ 
&UHDWLRQRIQHZ+RXVHRI&RPPRQV&KDPEHU 
6KLIWDZD\IURPDGYHUVDULDOVHDWLQJOD\RXW 
Redesign of spaces to fully incorporate public 
stakeholders in parliamentary activities. 
5DGLFDODGRSWLRQRI,&7WROLQNWKHSK\VLFDOIRRWSULQWWR
the digital footprint. 
Meso-
parliamentary 
[Modest] 
Secondary elements of the physical 
design of parliament that are shaped 
by or stem from the primary meta-
constitutional dynamic. 
&KDQJHVWRFRPPLWWHHURRPV 
Electronic voting in Parliament 
1HZSXEOLFVSDFHV 
0RYHVWRZDUGVDFKLOG-friendly environment 
Micro-
parliamentary 
[Minor] 
Third-order elements that amend or 
supplement existing physical 
arrangements of parliament, without 
impacting on the underpinning logic 
of the political system. 
1HZYLVLWRUFHQWUHLQFUHDVHGUHIUHVKPHQWDUHDVPRUH
female or gender-sensitive toilets 
,PSURYHGDFFHVVLELOLW\ 
Increased signage 
*HQGHULQFOXVLYHDUWZRUN 
 
 
TABLE 2: Key decision-stages in the R&R programme. 
Decision-stage 
 
Task/Outcome Actors 
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Study commissioned on 
Palace modernisation 
options, 
January 2012 
 
Agreement on need for Pre-Feasibility Study 
Group to review relevant documentation and 
examine full range of modernisation possibilities 
from new build/full modernisation, to managed 
replacement and maintenance 
House of Commons Commission: 
x Mr Speaker (chair), 
Leader of the House, 4 
other MPs 
House of Lords House Committee: 
x Lord Speaker (chair), 
assorted peers, Clerk of 
the Parliaments, assorted 
clerks, parliamentary 
management staff 
Pre-Feasibility Study 
Group established, 
January 2012 
 
Analysis of Palace condition, delineation of 
strategic case for change, mapping of decant 
strategy and issues 
Dr Richard Ware (Director): 
previously director of UK 
Parliament ICT and Resources. 
Parliamentary Director of Estates 
Mary Ollard Lords Representative 
Industry input (Tim Ainger, partner 
of Gardiner & Theobald LLP, 
non-executive member of 
Parliamentary Estates Board) 
2 Members from each House of 
Parliament respectively 
Consideration of PFS 
Report, October 2012 
 
Rejection of option for a new parliament 
building. 
Commissioning of fuller R&R options analysis to 
include detailed costings and decant strategies. 
House of Commons Commission 
(see above) 
House of Lords House Committee 
(see above) 
Independent Options 
Appraisal published, July 
2015 
 
Delivery of full Scenarios for R&R, decant 
options, costings 
Deloitte Real Estate, AECOM, 
HOK. 
Joint Committee on the 
Palace of Westminster 
established, July 2015 
 
Consideration of IOA report, recommendation 
of Scenario decision to Houses of Parliament 
Committee established by motions 
in both Houses.  
 
Recruitment of 
Architectural, Design and 
Project Management 
consortia, April 2016 
&RQVLGHUDWLRQRI¶VXLWDEOH·FDQGLGDWHVLQWHUPVRI
professional skills and experience 
Four companies short-listed but 
final decision awaiting debate and 
vote to proceed in both Houses. 
Publication of Joint 
Committee Report, 
September 2016 
To review the IOA report and make a 
recommendation to both Houses concerning the 
most appropriate reform pathway 
Leader of the House of Commons 
(co-chair) 
Leader of the House of Lords (co-
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chair)  
5 MPs, 5 peers. 
 
 
Table 3: R&R of the Palace of Westminster, Options and Estimates. 
 OPTION 1 
(ROLLING 
DECANT) 
OPTION 2 
(PARTIAL 
DECANT) 
OPTION 3 
(FULL DECANT) 
Outcome Level A E1A 
£5.67bn 
25-40 years 
32 years most likely 
2A 
£3.94bn 
9-14 years 
11 years most likely 
3A 
Outcome Level B 1B 2B 
£4.42bn 
9-14 years 
11 most likely 
3B 
£3.52bn 
5-8 years 
6 most likely 
Outcome Level C 1C 2C 3C 
£3.87bn 
5-8 years 
6 most likely 
Source: Deloitte (2015, pp.5, 10-15). 
 
 
 
